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The Market for  
Local Public Goods 
H. Spencer Banzhaf† 
Abstract 
Markets are an efficient way to allocate goods and services in an 
economy, but sometimes markets are said to “fail,” such as when they 
are unable to provide public goods. I argue that for a wide class of 
environmental and other public goods—namely, local public goods 
provided by local jurisdictions—a market-like process does provide and 
allocate those goods. This argument, originally articulated by Charles 
Tiebout in 1956, has been criticized in recent decades as ignoring a 
jurisdictional choice externality, in which too many households crowd 
into desirable communities in an attempt to free ride on the public 
goods provided by neighbors. However, zoning is a key mechanism for 
closing the commons and preventing overcrowding. Proponents of the 
critique have offered various types of empirical evidence purporting to 
support their point of view and the ineffectualness of zoning. However, 
I argue that the empirical work to date on this issue either 
fundamentally misunderstands the issues or actually imposes the 
critique as a maintained assumption, rather than testing it. I present 
empirical evidence that is consistent with the idea that zoning achieves 
the desired end of pricing access to local public goods. 
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Introduction 
One definition of an economy is a social process that determines 
what a society produces, how it produces it, and to whom it allocates 
it. Given the set of possible goods to produce, the potential production 
methods, and the people to assign them to, the number of potential 
answers to those questions is enormous. How can all those decisions 
possibly be coordinated? One idea is to gather the best-trained social 
scientists, give them the best available data about production costs and 
the needs of the population, give them the best computers available to 
crunch the data, and let them coordinate the decisions through 
centralized command and control. 
A very different approach is to use free markets to coordinate those 
decisions in a decentralized fashion. As Friedrich Hayek famously 
argued over a half century ago, markets have the ability to process 
diffuse information and feed it back to participants making decisions in 
the economy.1 Consider, for example, the market for men’s running 
 
1. F. A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519 
(1945). See generally PHILIP MIROWSKI, MACHINE DREAMS: ECONOMICS 
BECOMES A CYBORG SCIENCE (2002) (presenting a much wider-ranging 
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shoes and suppose in one year that demand is strong for some 
unanticipated reason. In that case, given supplies, retailers may raise 
their prices or, alternatively, decline to put men’s running shoes on sale. 
Seeing the higher prices, manufacturers will want to make more of those 
types of shoes. Conversely, if there are too many, prices will fall and 
suppliers will stop producing shoes for a time until inventories fall and 
prices rise again. Producers and retailers, as entrepreneurs, smell out 
the opportunity to make profits and both set their prices and react to 
prices accordingly. In this way, markets can provide a self-regulating 
order coordinating an economy’s production and allocative decisions.  
There is a consensus among economists that such forces work well 
in most circumstances. The debates center on the exceptions—about 
where and when the exceptions occur and how significant they are when 
they do. One such contested area is a set of goods known as “public 
goods”—goods that are shared by groups. Some public goods, like 
national defense, must be provided by national governments. Other 
public goods like police, fire safety, city streets, and schools can be, and 
typically are, provided by local jurisdictions.  
This Article will consider the case of such local public goods, 
emphasizing cases where local jurisdictions partially determine the 
quality of the local environment enjoyed by local residents. Consider, 
for example, the case of local green spaces, important environmental 
amenities. These can be influenced by zoning (such as minimum lot 
sizes), conservation easements, purchase of conservation lands or parks, 
urban forestry practices, and so forth.  
The city’s morphology and tree canopy, in turn, can affect local air 
pollution and urban heat island effects. Other local policies affect air 
quality more directly. Rules allowing or prohibiting industrial activities 
are one obvious example. Another is the area’s transportation policies, 
from individually small engineering projects that improve the flow of 
traffic on a city street to walkable neighborhoods to county- or regional-
level mass transit systems. By the same token, the city’s morphology 
and tree canopy can affect storm water runoff, stream quality, and the 
water table. Local water conservation ordinances and practices can 
affect water levels in lakes and streams. Treatment of municipal 
wastewater and/or regulations on septic tanks affect water quality. And 
so forth. In practice in the United States today, many of these policies 
are influenced by federal as well as local policies. But this does not 
diminish the important role for local jurisdictions or, more to the point, 
the potential for them to be largely or even solely delegated to local 
jurisdictions. 
 
overview of the turn in modern economics to the idea of information 
processing); Bruce Caldwell, Hayek and Socialism, 35 J. ECON. 
LITERATURE 1856 (1997) (reviewing Hayek’s argument, set in the 
historical context of his debate with market socialism).  
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It is not the purpose of this Article to survey this entire field or 
discuss all the proposed—and contested—limitations to markets.2 
However, I will argue that for locally provided public goods, a market—
or, at least, a market-like process—coordinates the level and allocation 
of local public goods provided by local jurisdictions such as counties 
and municipalities. Accordingly, when these public goods are provided 
by local governments out of local tax revenues or with local codes and 
regulations, market-like forces help ensure better outcomes. The same 
cannot be said when these goods are provided by state or federal 
governments. For this reason, I suggest that public decisions should be 
made at the local level whenever possible, as is consonant with the 
principle of subsidiarity.3 
The idea that cities compete in a market-like environment was first 
and most famously articulated by Charles Tiebout in 1956.4 In this 
Article, I will introduce Tiebout’s original argument, discuss its 
implications, and discuss the potential weakness in the argument. In 
particular, important questions surround the extent to which local 
property taxes and zoning ordinances interfere with markets. In this 
Article, I will argue that zoning, far from interfering with local property 
 
2. See generally RICHARD CORNES & TODD SANDLER, THE THEORY OF 
EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC GOODS, AND CLUB GOODS (2d ed. 1996) 
(providing a general overview of the limitations of markets); David D. 
Haddock, Why Individuals Provide Public Goods, in ACCOUNTING FOR 
MOTHER NATURE: CHANGING DEMANDS FOR HER BOUNTY 261 (Terry L. 
Anderson et al. eds., 2008) (making a vigorous defense of the potential of 
markets to provide more environmental public goods than is often 
acknowledged); Terry L. Anderson & Dominic P. Parker, Transaction 
Costs and Environmental Markets: The Role of Entrepreneurs, 7 REV. 
ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 259, 273 (2013) (noting that environmental 
entrepreneurs can be more successful when looking at “positive 
transaction costs as an opportunity rather than a problem” and that, “[b]y 
adopting innovative strategies that lower the transaction costs of 
economic exchange, these entrepreneurs are constantly finding new ways 
to capture the value of environmental resources”). 
3. The idea of subsidiarity originated in Catholic social doctrine. See Pope 
Pius XI, Quadragesimo Anno § 80 (1931). See generally Wallace E. 
Oates, Fiscal Federalism (1972); George A. Bermann, Taking 
Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European Community and the 
United States, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 331 (1994) (discussing modern legal and 
policy contexts). Much of the economic discussion on this issue focuses on 
spatially delimited public goods such as environmental quality. For 
discussions in that context, though with broader implications, see 
generally Jonathan H. Adler, Jurisdictional Mismatch in Environmental 
Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 130 (2005); Wallace E. Oates, A 
Reconsideration of Environmental Federalism, in RECENT ADVANCES IN 
ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS 1, 22 (John A. List & Aart de Zeeuw eds., 
2002). 
4. Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. 
ECON. 416 (1956). 
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markets, actually plays a crucial role in facilitating those markets. I 
also present empirical findings consistent with the notion that zoning 
has been sufficient to price entry into local jurisdictions. 
In Part I, I first overview some basic principles of public goods 
generally, before moving on to discuss the case of local public goods 
and local jurisdictions in Part II. 
I. Public Goods: Market Failure or 
Market Provision? 
A. Non-Excludability and Non-Rivalry 
Public goods are characterized by two features, non-excludability 
and non-rivalry.5 Markets sometimes are said to “fail” under such 
circumstances because the price mechanism either seemingly cannot 
work or would not make sense even if it could.6 
Consider first the excludability problem. With private goods, 
people can be excluded from enjoying the good if they do not pay for 
them: no cash, no shoes. This does not necessarily hold for public goods. 
Even if people do not pay for them, they cannot feasibly be excluded 
from enjoying public goods like clean air or a sound national defense. 
It is, after all, pretty hard to ask somebody not to breathe or to let slip 
through only those terrorists targeting people who fail to contribute to 
the national defense. So the argument goes that if those goods were 
provided by a market, people would under-provide these goods and try 
to free ride off others who pay for them. 
The interpretation, or evaluation, of the excludability problem 
depends on the extent to which the second feature, non-rivalry, is also 
present. Rivalry centers on the question of whether one person’s 
enjoyment of a good detracts from another person’s ability to enjoy it. 
Private goods are rivalrous: if I wear a pair of shoes, then you cannot 
wear them too. Public goods are not: if I breathe the clean air in a city, 
it will not detract from your enjoyment of the same air at all. Thus, 
non-rivalry raises the question of whether it would be desirable to 
exclude people from enjoying a good, even if it were feasible. Even if I 
 
5. See Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REV. 
ECON. & STAT. 387 (1954) (discussing public goods) and Cornes & 
Sandler, supra note 2 (providing a more modern and comprehensive 
treatment); but see R. H. Coase, The Lighthouse in Economics, 17 J.L. & 
ECON. 357 (1974) (for an opposing view). See generally H. Spencer 
Banzhaf et al., Nonregulatory Approaches to the Environment: Coasean 
and Pigouvian Perspectives, 7 REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 238 (2013) 
(discussing specifically non-excludability and non-rivalry and the range of 
government policies and non-governmental institutions that can overcome 
them). 
6. Francis M. Bator, The Anatomy of Market Failure, 72 Q. J. ECON. 351 
(1958). 
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were a free rider in the contribution to air quality, and even if it were 
possible to exclude me from such air, would it make sense to do so, 
given my enjoyment does not detract from others’?7 Goods like these, 
where non-rivalry is present as well as non-excludability, are known as 
pure public good. 
When non-excludability is present but not non-rivalry, the good is 
known as a commons good. A classic example is a fishery, in which the 
fish are rivalrous (if I catch one—or eat one!—you cannot) but in which 
there is open access to the sea.8 Unless institutions are developed to 
overcome the problem, the resulting economic incentives drive 
overfishing, with individuals considering their own catch without 
considering how it diminishes the catch of others. This is known as the 
“tragedy of the commons.”9 
B. Overcoming the Excludability Problem: Closing the Commons 
The excludability problem, though sometimes a challenge, can often 
be overcome. Indeed, entrepreneurs have devised many ways to do so.10 
1. Clubs 
One simple example of overcoming the excludability problem in the 
provision of public goods is clubs, like local swim and tennis clubs.11 A 
swimming pool is non-rivalrous, at least up to a point at which it 
becomes congested, so it makes sense for a large number of people to 
pitch in and enjoy the pool together. This could not happen if free 
 
7. Actually, the best answer may be “maybe.” If the good were supported 
with private fees, it would inefficiently exclude some low-willingness-to-
pay (but also non-rival) consumers. See Harold Hotelling, The General 
Welfare in Relation to Problems of Taxation and of Railway and Utility 
Rates, 6 ECONOMETRICA 242 (1938). On the other hand, if the good were 
supported with government funds, it would inefficiently impose taxes, 
which creates a dilemma: inefficient exclusion of a non-rivalrous good or 
inefficient subsidization. See R. H. Coase, The Theory of Public Utility 
Pricing and Its Application, 1 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 113 (1970). 
8. H. Scott Gordon, The Economic Theory of a Common-Property 
Resource: The Fishery, 62 J. POL. ECON. 124 (1954). 
9. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968); 
Elinor Ostrom, Tragedy of the Commons, NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY 
OF ECONOMICS http://www.dictionaryofeconomics.com/article?id=pde 
2008_T000193 (Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume eds., 2008). 
10. See Anderson & Parker, supra note 2 (providing an overview in the 
context of environmental goods). 
11. See James M. Buchanan, An Economic Theory of Clubs, 32 ECONOMICA 
1 (1965). See generally CORNES & SANDLER, supra note 2; Matthew J. 
Kotchen, Voluntary- and Information-Based Approaches to 
Environmental Management: A Public Economics Perspective, 7 REV. 
ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 276 (2013); Todd Sandler & John Tschirhart, Club 
Theory: Thirty Years Later, 93 PUB. CHOICE 335 (1997). 
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riding were a severe problem. But, in fact, excludability is not a real 
problem here: it is a simple matter to build a gate around the pool and 
check ID cards. Clubs do precisely that. They gather fees from 
members, fix a limit on the number of members beyond which 
congestion would be a problem, provide public goods to the members, 
and exclude nonmembers. As James Buchanan has shown, clubs look a 
lot like an efficient market with private firms each having some limited 
economies of scale: market discipline in which clubs can form and 
dissolve leads them to be the optimal size (which balances the 
economies of scale of allowing more people to use a fixed resource and 
the congestion of too many people), and, moreover, individual 
households join those clubs that most suit them.12 
2. Bundling and Weak Complementarity 
Another approach to the private provision of public goods involves 
a strategy that economists call “bundling.”13 Bundling is a concept that 
is much broader than public goods: it involves any situation where two 
or more goods are grouped together and sold as a package (hence, 
“bundle”), whether those goods are public goods or not. For example, 
automobiles may be viewed as a bundle of an engine, a body, a stereo 
system, and so forth. Monopolies often try to bundle goods together as 
a way to exploit their monopoly power.14 An example in this context is 
when Microsoft tried to bundle Internet Explorer with Windows. In 
some of these contexts, bundling may be problematic from an efficiency 
point of view because it exacerbates monopoly power. 
But when public goods are bundled with a private good, it can 
overcome the excludability problem and thus be efficiency enhancing.15 
This is especially true when preferences for the public good and the 
private good are governed by a condition that economists call “weak 
complementarity.”16 Weak complementarity is a special kind of 
relationship between two goods, where one good does not matter to a 
consumer unless it is consumed jointly with a second good. A simple 
example might be a consumer who does not care about jam unless he 
also has bread. Another might be a consumer who doesn’t care about 
gasoline unless he also has a car. 
 
12. Buchanan, supra note 11. 
13. William James Adams & Janet L. Yellen, Commodity Bundling and the 
Burden of Monopoly, 90 Q. J. ECON. 475 (1976). 
14. Id. 
15. See Banzhaf et al., supra note 5; Geoffrey Heal, Bundling Biodiversity, 1 
J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 553 (2003); Kotchen supra note 11. 
16. See KARL-GÖRAN MÄLER, ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS: A THEORETICAL 
INQUIRY 183–91 (1974); V. Kerry Smith & H. Spencer Banzhaf, A 
Diagrammatic Exposition of Weak Complementarity and the Willig 
Condition, 86 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 455 (2004). 
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When entrepreneurs bundle a public good with a private weak 
complement, it can overcome the excludability problem. Although 
consumers might be able to avoid supporting a public good in isolation, 
if the public good is only enjoyed when it is consumed with a private 
weak complement then consumers will be forced to pay for the private 
good to enjoy the public good. The payment for the private good, in 
turn, provides an opportunity to collect for the public good at the same 
time.17 To see this more clearly, consider two examples. 
One example is ecotourism.18 In this case, the public good may be 
birds in Costa Rican rain forest habitat or elephants and other wildlife 
in southern Africa. Without doubt, these are special things, and people 
have value for them. Many people would value the opportunity to see 
them firsthand in their natural environment. But to do so, they would 
need a nearby lodge at which to stay and a guided safari tour. One 
cannot enjoy the elephants without these things. Yet access to the lodge 
and the safari are easily excludable. They are private weak 
complements linked to the public good. To put it in other terms, they 
are a gateway to the public good. People are willing to pay for the lodge 
and safari guide, but only because they are the gateway to the elephants 
and other wildlife. Entrepreneurs know this, so the lodge owner and/or 
the safari guide have an incentive to provide elephant habitat.19 
Another example—one closer to our context of local public goods—
comes from real estate development. Geoffrey Heal tells the story of 
Spring Island, South Carolina, which was highly prized for its 
ecosystem.20 When the island’s land came up for sale, the state tried to 
bid for it but was outbid by a private developer, much to the chagrin 
of environmentalists. Yet the developer developed only 500 of the 5500 
developable lots, deeding the remainder to a land trust. Because the 
conservation land was so valuable, 500 lots nearby such an ecosystem 
could command a premium even above 5500 without the nearby 
conservation. This dynamic again depended on a kind of weak 
complementarity and bundling. The developed lots were essentially 
bundled to a nearby preserve. Because people could only enjoy that 
preserve (or, at least, could much more easily enjoy that preserve) with  
17. Banzhaf et al., supra note 5, at 246–47. 
18. For discussion of this example, see Geoffrey Heal, Nature and the 
Marketplace: Capturing the Value of Ecosystem Services 61–
70 (2000); Anderson & Parker, supra note 2, at 270–71. 
19. In the specific case of elephants, CAMPFIRE programs originating in 
Zimbabwe are a classic example of this dynamic. See Anderson & Parker, 
supra note 2, at 270. Of course, other examples can be found for other 
types of ecotourism. 
20. Geoffrey Heal, Bundling Public and Private Goods: Are Residential 
Development and Environmental Conservation Necessarily in Conflict? 1 
(rev. April 2001) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www2. 
bren.ucsb.edu/~kolstad/events/workshop_5-01/papers/Heal_paper.pdf. 
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property nearby, they were willing to pay more for such property. This, 
in turn, provided an incentive to the developer to protect the majority 
of the land. 
II. A Market in Local Public Goods 
In this Part, I argue that the provision of local public goods by local 
jurisdictions closely resembles the private provision of public goods 
discussed in the previous sections. The essence of the argument lies in 
the model of Charles Tiebout, who famously argued that citizens choose 
communities very much like the way they choose private goods.21 
Consequently, just as consumers win when businesses compete, citizens 
win when cities compete. 
A. Excludability in Local Public Goods 
When viewed in the light of club theory and the theory of bundling 
discussed in the previous section, local public goods begin to look more 
like excludable private goods than like pure public goods. Consider a 
local public good such as a county library system. It is a simple matter 
for a librarian to check for a library card before lending out the books. 
In this respect, the library is not unlike a private recreation club. Just 
as you can only use the pool if you pay your membership fee, you can 
only check out the book if you are a local resident (and, thus, probably, 
a taxpayer). Another, more important example is local public schools. 
One’s children cannot attend the schools unless they are proven to be 
local residents. The library card or other proofs of residency are no 
different than the membership cards at the private club: they are the 
gateway to enjoying the local public goods within. 
Of course, many public goods like local parks and air quality do not 
have gateways. Most city parks welcome any visitors to enjoy their 
picnic tables and playgrounds, and anybody can breathe the air. But, 
for the most part, one does not really enjoy these goods unless one lives 
or works near them. For example, I did not really care about Atlanta’s 
parks or its air quality when I lived in Washington, D.C., but I did 
when I moved to Atlanta. Although occasionally one may visit the park 
 
21. Tiebout, supra note 4, at 422. Though Tiebout’s argument is well known 
in the academic literature, what is less understood is that he was explicitly 
critiquing Samuelson’s argument that markets cannot provide public 
goods. Samuelson, supra note 5, at 388. Tiebout’s title, A Pure Theory of 
Local Expenditures, is clearly a play on Samuelson’s more pretentious The 
Pure Theory of Public Expenditure. For background on Tiebout and his 
motives, see generally William A. Fischel, Footloose at Fifty: An 
Introduction to the Tiebout Anniversary Essays, in The Tiebout Model 
at Fifty: Essays in Public Economics in Honor of Wallace 
Oates 1, 1–4 (William A. Fischel ed., 2006). 
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of a nearby jurisdiction, for the most part these public goods are only 
enjoyed by the citizens of the jurisdiction that provides them.22 
Thus, local public goods are bundled to the private weak 
complement of local real estate. In the same way that the Spring Island 
real estate developer bundled his development to a conservation 
preserve, land and housing in any community are bundled to its local 
public goods, taxes, and zoning restrictions. One does not enjoy those 
goods (or pay those costs) unless one lives in the community. Living in 
the community, in turn, requires owning or renting real estate in the 
community, and real estate is an excludable private good. 
Consequently, we really do have a market in public goods—local 
public goods at least. The real estate market is not just a market in 
land: it also is a market in the public goods available to people living 
on that land. 
B. Rivalry and Non-Rivalry in Local Public Goods 
Of course, overcoming the excludability problem is not the entire 
story. It may only make clear sense to exclude somebody if non-rivalry 
is not also present. To sort out this issue, it is again helpful to 
distinguish between the real estate and the bundled local amenities and 
publicly provided goods. Clearly, the real estate itself is rivalrous. If I 
put a house on a lot, you cannot. Likewise, if I live in a house, you 
cannot. Thus, it makes sense to treat land and housing capital as 
private goods, and of course we do. 
What about locational amenities and publicly provided goods? Such 
goods may be non-rivalrous or rivalrous depending on subtleties in how 
they are defined and whether the local population can affect the 
amenity through congestion. Consider first amenities like proximity to 
the sea, the local climate, or air quality. Proximity to the sea may seem 
as exogenous as an amenity can be, and unaffected by the population. 
If so, then my enjoyment of this amenity does not detract from 
another’s ability to enjoy it, and it is non-rivalrous. However, if what 
we really mean is not literally proximity but rather access to the sea, 
it may be that adding more people to a jurisdiction near the sea does 
have a congestion effect, after a point. For a sparsely populated area, 
there may be no congestion. But as more people crowd into the area, 
transportation routes to the sea may become congested, limiting 
accessibility, or perhaps the seaside itself may become crowded. In this 
 
22. Thus, it is fitting that the scale of the jurisdiction matches the extent of 
the market for the public good. See Oates, supra note 3, at 33. For 
example, cities provide smaller parks attracting only very nearby 
residents; counties provide larger parks drawing households from a larger 
area; states and nations provide still larger parks attracting households 
from still wider areas. Likewise, cities provide local streets, counties 
provide roads and rural highways, and states and nations provide 
expressways. 
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case, the congestion effects make the public good rivalrous: if I move in 
to enjoy the access to the sea, it does indeed affect others’ access. 
Similar stories can be told for local climate, air quality, and open 
space. At first, for a sparsely populated area, these things may be 
exogenous, determined by nature (in the case of climate) and far-flung 
industrial activities (in the case of air quality). If I move to a sparsely 
populated location to enjoy the climate, it will not affect the climate 
and will not affect others’ enjoyment of it. So far, the climate is non-
rivalrous. But as more people move in, additional people may affect the 
local climate, as the lost tree canopy, additional hardscape, and so forth 
contribute to an urban heat island effect.23 Likewise, in the case of air 
quality, the local air shed may at first be able to absorb the wastes of 
a small population without much apparent effect, but as more people 
arrive, its capacity may become congested and overwhelmed by the lost 
tree canopy and the additional driving, lawn mowing, barbecues, and 
so forth, at which point the atmosphere becomes a rivalrous good.24 In 
the case of open space, people may value both permanently protected 
open space like parks and nature areas and the greenery on private 
open space like low-density lots. Providing a park can attract people, 
but as people move in to enjoy the amenity, the higher density 
decreases the private greenery and, hence, total green space.25 
Finally, consider locally tax-financed public goods, such as city 
streets, schools, and parks. Economists generally view these goods as 
congested as well.26 Again, perhaps at first they are uncongested and 
 
23. See Brian Stone, Jr., The City and the Coming Climate: Climate 
Change in the Places We Live 83 (2012). 
24. For discussion of atmospheric congestion at a more global level, see 
Banzhaf et al., supra note 5, at 248–49; Brendan Fisher, R. Kerry Turner 
& Paul Morling, Defining and Classifying Ecosystem Services for Decision 
Making, 68 Ecological Econ. 643, 647 (2009). 
25. See Randy Walsh, Endogenous Open Space Amenities in a Locational 
Equilibrium, 61 J. Urb. Econ. 319, 343 (2007). 
26. See, e.g., Stephen M. Calabrese, Dennis N. Epple & Richard E. Romano, 
Inefficiencies from Metropolitan Political and Fiscal Decentralization: 
Failures of Tiebout Competition, 79 Rev. Econ. Stud. 1081, 1082–86 & 
n.10 (2012) (explaining when a public good is “fully congested” and giving 
parks and schools as examples of congested public goods); Wallace E. 
Oates, On the Theory and Practice of Fiscal Decentralization, Inst. for 
Federalism and Intergovernmental Rel. 6 (May 2006), 
http://www.ifigr.org/publication/ ifir_working_papers/IFIR-WP-2006-
05.pdf. For evidence of such congestion, see Alain Guengant, Jean-Michel 
Josselin & Yvon Rocaboy, Effects of Club Size in the Provision of Public 
Goods: Network and Congestion Effects in the Case of the French 
Municipalities, 81 Papers Regional Sci. 443 (2002) (putting forward a 
theoretical model of congestion effects of public goods in French cities and 
towns); Michael Reiter & Alfons Weichenrieder, Are Public Goods 
Public?: A Critical Survey of the Demand Estimates for Local Public 
Services, 54 FINANZARCHIV 374 (1997) (surveying the literature that 
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non-rivalrous. Perhaps a fixed expenditure needs to be made for a park, 
and as more people are added to the city the benefit of spreading that 
expenditure among more people outweighs any congestion effect. But 
eventually, the congestion effect will take hold. At the margin, it may 
be that what matters is expenditure per person for many of these goods, 
rather than total expenditures. This appears to be the case for many 
such goods.27 
 
 
 
Figure 1A: Effects of Local Population on Local Air Quality
 
investigates the publicness of government-provided services and finding 
that such public goods are so crowded they are essentially like private 
goods); Albert Solé-Ollé & Núria Bosch, On the Relationship Between 
Authority Size and the Costs of Providing Local Services: Lessons for the 
Design of Intergovernmental Transfers in Spain, 33 Pub. Fin. Rev. 343, 
374–76 (2005) (discussing results showing a relationship between 
population size and costs in Spanish municipalities). 
27. See, e.g., Solé-Ollé & Bosch, supra note 26, at 374. 
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Figure 1B: Effects of Local Population on Cost of 
Maintaining Local Air Quality 
 
There are two sides to the coin of these congestion effects. On one 
side, one might say that, holding public expenditures and other policies 
fixed, the quality of the public good changes with the population size. 
This relationship is demonstrated in Figure 1A for the example of air 
pollution. Holding regulations fixed, at first adding more people does 
not affect air quality, but eventually it does, with air quality declining 
with population (and the activities that go with that population). On 
the other side of the coin, one might say that it becomes more costly 
to maintain a given level of air quality as the population rises. One 
might need to restrict polluting activities, and these restrictions have 
costs. This relationship is depicted in Figure 1B. 
In the case of congested, rivalrous local public goods like these, it 
does make sense to exclude some people from enjoying them in any 
particular location. If too many people tried to pack into a particular 
jurisdiction, it would create intolerable crowding to the detriment of 
all, with effects on air quality, open space, and so forth as discussed 
above.  
Of course, if the goods are not congested it would not make sense 
to exclude people from those public goods—that is, those goods per se. 
If that were the end of the story, we would conclude that it would make 
sense to put everybody in Malibu, or in similarly beautiful places 
(barring congestion effects). However, recall that such amenities are 
tied, through weak complementarity, to local real estate markets.28 I  
28. See discussion supra Part I.B.2. 
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cannot enjoy the climate of a location unless I live there, and I cannot 
live there unless I have housing there. As noted above, real estate itself 
is rivalrous. Accordingly, there will be limits to how many people can 
optimally fit into a site even if there is no congestion of the public good. 
That is, even if the public good per se is not rivalrous, the bundle of 
housing and the public good is rivalrous. Thus, even if it does not make 
sense to exclude people from these amenities per se, it does make sense 
to limit access to the land that goes with them. 
The rivalry, non-rivalry, and weak complementarity of these 
aspects of the jurisdictional bundle all have implications for the pricing 
of that bundle. I consider this issue in the following sub-section. 
C. The Price People Pay 
In a well-functioning market economy, prices reflect the scarcity of 
resources, and this is no less true of a market for local public goods. In 
markets for local public goods, the nature of the scarcity varies by the 
three types of goods discussed in the previous subsection (the real 
estate, uncongested amenities, and congested local public goods). 
Consequently, the way prices reflect scarcity varies by these goods  
as well. 
Consider first the real estate in isolation (absent consideration of 
any locational amenities or public goods). With no locational amenities, 
there would be nothing distinguishing land in one place from land in 
another place, so everywhere would have the same price of land (per 
sq. ft.), reflecting its opportunity cost, which is the value of the land to 
the person or persons just excluded from using it. Prices for lots would 
be linear in square footage.  
In fact, as we all know from the real estate agent’s motto, real 
estate boils down to three things: “location, location, location.” 
Property is inextricably linked to local amenities in a community. The 
demand for living in areas that have nice amenities will be higher, and 
that demand will be reflected in higher real estate values. Since at least 
the work of David Ricardo in the early 19th century, economists have 
understood that such amenities are “capitalized” into property values.29 
These higher real estate costs become the price for these amenities. The 
price of land will be higher in areas with nicer amenities. 
In a well-functioning market, prices reflect scarcity. Consequently, 
just exactly how local amenities and public goods are priced into land 
should reflect the scarcity of resources. Here, the question of rivalry 
comes into play again. If they are non-rivalrous, the amenities 
themselves are not really scarce. But the amenities are inevitably linked 
to land, and the land itself is scarce and rivalrous—and scarcer where 
linked to nicer amenities (since demand is higher). Thus, the price of 
 
29. David Ricardo, On The Principles of Political Economy and 
Taxation 52–55 (1817) (focusing on the example of differences in the 
agricultural fertility of land, which affects the rental prices of land). 
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uncongested amenities is appropriately reflected in higher land prices. 
The amenity per se is not priced, but land is pricier per square foot 
when linked to nicer amenities. 
Note a further consequence of these higher land prices. Because, 
ceteris paribus, people consume less of a thing when it is more 
expensive, we would expect lot sizes to be smaller as a consequence of 
these higher real estate prices. This allows more people to crowd into 
areas with nicer amenities, which is also entirely efficient so long as the 
amenities remain non-rivalrous. 
If the public goods in a community are congested, then access to 
the public good per se—i.e., access to the community—should be 
priced, just like membership in a club. But the critical difference is that 
this scarcity is unrelated to the amount of land consumed. If I move 
into any given jurisdiction, the burden I impose on its roads, parks, and 
so forth is unrelated to the amount of land I consume. These prices are 
like “tickets” for entering a community that fall on the person entering, 
not the land or housing. 
Finally, consider in particular local public goods like schools and 
parks financed with local taxes. When the taxes supporting these things 
are added to the equation, the price for purchasing the bundle becomes 
the gross-of-tax price of property in the community. That is, the tax 
on top of the price of the land and capital (reflecting the scarcity rents 
created by locational amenities). Ceteris paribus, if members of a 
community want more public services, they will have to pay for them 
through higher taxes. The same may be said of amenities produced 
through local regulations. The regulations have a cost on landowners 
and residents, no less real than taxes. The cost of residing in a 
community then becomes the real estate price gross of taxes and 
regulatory burdens. 
These two aspects of the price for local public goods—higher real 
estate values and higher property taxes or regulatory burdens—come 
together when we consider two cities, one that is efficiently managed 
and one that is not. When a city is well managed, it delivers higher 
quality services and amenities for a given tax burden, making it more 
desirable. People will move in, reflecting greater demand for housing in 
that community. That higher demand quickly translates into higher 
property values. Conversely, when a community is poorly managed, 
people will move out, driving down property values. These differentials 
are also reflected in the prices for public goods in this market. Consider 
two communities with the same tax levy, but one that is efficient and 
provides a high level of public services with those funds, and another 
that is inefficient and provides a low level of public services with the 
same expenditure. If the taxes were the only price paid, everybody 
would prefer to live in the first community over the second. But this 
imbalance in supply and demand would translate into a lower price for 
real estate in the second community: households would require a 
discount to move into the second community, and that discount is the 
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lower real estate value. In sum, the price for consuming efficient 
management as well as the public goods in a local jurisdiction is the 
gross-of-tax price of real estate. 
In his original model, Tiebout accounted for the need for tickets to 
a community by assuming that jurisdictions use lump-sum taxes, or 
head taxes.30 In reality, of course, most jurisdictions use property taxes 
to fund their public goods. But property taxes are higher for larger lots. 
Computationally, they just increase the per-unit price of housing. Thus, 
on the surface, they would appear to price rivalrous local public goods 
in the same way that higher land prices price non-rivalrous amenities. 
I take this issue up further in Section III. 
For now, it is enough to make the point that, though there is no 
market in public goods per se, there is a linked market for local public 
goods. The price in that market is the gross-of-tax housing price. So 
far, this is just like a private good. Of course, in the case of private 
goods, an individual can decide whether or not to spend more money 
for more consumption goods. In the case of local public goods, the 
members of a community make this decision collectively. However, 
individual choice is still relevant, because people are free to join or leave 
the community. In the long run, individuals will live in those 
communities that most closely fit the level of public expenditure and 
mix of public expenditures they most desire. 
D. When Cities Compete: A Consumer’s Menu of Options 
As I am arguing that local public goods are not unlike privately 
provided goods, a reasonable question to ask is how competitive the 
“market” for such goods is. In this section, I will argue that the market 
for local public goods is quite competitive, as long as they are in fact 
locally provided. 
When local governments are responsible for providing public goods, 
people choosing where to live have a greater menu of options available 
to them. Most metropolitan areas have a large number of local 
jurisdictions. Some might bemoan this “fragmentation” because it 
limits coordination.31 A more optimistic view is that a diversity of local 
jurisdictions allows a thousand flowers to bloom. 
Just how much diversity is there? One way to think about that 
question is to use measures borrowed from the economics of industrial 
organization, which are designed to measure the level of competition 
among firms in an industry. We can similarly use those measures to 
 
30. Tiebout, supra note 4, at 417 (referring to a “benefits tax”). 
31. See generally, e.g., Jon C. Teaford, City and Suburb: The Political 
Fragmentation of Metropolitan America, 1850–1970 1, 33 (1979) 
(arguing that “[t]he result of this fragmentation is inefficiency, confusion 
of authority, and disparity in shouldering the burdens of the metropolis”). 
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look at the competition among jurisdictions in a metropolitan area.32 
The top panel of Table 1 shows two measures of competition for a 
handful of industries. The first measure is the four-firm concentration 
ratio. It shows the proportion of sales captured by the four largest firms 
in the industry. The second measure is known as a Herfindahl index. It 
uses information from all the firms, but is also normalized on a 0 to 1 
scale, with 0 representing infinite competition and 1 representing 
perfect monopoly.33 As a rule of thumb, an index score below 0.25 is 
considered competitive. The table shows a wide range of values. The 
second panel of the table shows these measures for cities, looking at the 
share of a metropolitan area’s housing units accounted for by each 
jurisdiction. The panel shows the most concentrated of the 50 largest 
US Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) (El Paso), the least 
concentrated (Miami), and selected top-50 MSAs in between.34 If we 
think of a metropolitan area as a market, and each city or town as a 
firm, then the table indicates that local governments are competing 
every bit as much as private firms in our economy.  
 
32. This idea was first suggested and illustrated by William A. Fischel, Is 
Local Government Structure in Large Urbanized Areas Monopolistic or 
Competitive?, 34 Nat’l Tax J. 95, 96–99 (1981). 
33. For an industry with I firms indexed {1…i…I}, and with firm i having a 
market share of si (expressed as a proportion), the Herfindahl index is 
computed as ∑ ݏ௜ଶூ௜ୀଵ . The Herfindahl index consists of the sum of the 
squares of the market shares in an industry. The index reflects the amount 
of competition in any given industry, with an index closer to 1 reflecting 
a decrease in competition, and an index closer to 0 reflecting an increase 
in competition. An advantage in using the Herfindahl index is that it gives 
weight to larger firms taking up larger areas of the market. 
34. I rank the MSAs by population, excluding any population not in an 
incorporated place or designated Census place and excluding three MSAs 
with more than 1/3 of their populations in unincorporated or 
undesignated places. 
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Four-Firm  
Concentration 
Ratio 
Herfindahl 
Index 
Industry 
Brewing 0.90 0.3680 
Breakfast Cereal 0.80 0.2426 
Men’s Footwear 0.57 0.1059 
Book Printing 0.43 0.0646 
Soap & Detergent 0.42 0.0904 
Fruit & Vegetable 
Canning 
0.26 0.0306 
Bolts, Nuts, Rivets, 
Washers 
0.09 0.0030 
Metropolitan Areas 
El Paso, TX 0.92 0.728 
Houston, TX 0.71 0.396 
Phoenix, AZ 0.64 0.179 
Milwaukee, WI 0.56 0.196 
San Francisco, CA 0.49 0.105 
Los Angeles, CA 0.42 0.118 
Chicago, IL 0.41 0.132 
Cleveland, OH 0.38 0.081 
Boston, MA 0.30 0.054 
Washington, DC 0.29 0.038 
Miami, FL 0.20 0.022 
Table 1 Market Concentration in Selected Industries and Cities 
Manufacturing concentration ratios and Herfindahl indices from 
2007 Census of Manufactures available at www.census.gov, with 
the exception of the Herfindahl index for brewing, which is from 
William James Adams, Markets: Beer in Germany and the United 
States, 20 J. Econ. Persp. 189 (2006). City concentration ratios 
and Herfindahl indices calculated by the author from U.S. Census 
Bureau, 2010 Urban Area to Place Relationship File, 
available at http://www.census.gov/geo/maps-data/data/ua_rel 
_download.html. 
With this wide range of choices, households can better find the 
community that best fits their needs and tastes. It goes without saying 
that individual households differ in the relative value they place on 
different aspects of local consumption bundles and in their willingness 
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to pay for them. For example, poor households may prioritize private 
goods like inexpensive housing over public goods, and so are unwilling 
to live in a high-tax, high-public goods community. In contrast, richer 
households may be willing (and able) to forego more private goods in 
order to enjoy more public services and local amenities, and so are 
willing to pay higher taxes and real estate prices. Too, different 
individuals might prioritize different public goods. The poor may value 
local bus services. Families with children may prioritize good schools 
and community parks. People with asthma may prioritize clean air. 
And so forth. 
In work in Los Angeles, my co-authors and I found that when we 
defined “communities” as the 105 school districts in the region, there 
was a wide range of choices available in all these characteristics.35 We 
found that 
 the mean scores on a California achievement test ranged from 
149 to 333;  
 annual property and violent crimes ranged from 2.3 per 100 
residents to 11.5; and 
 days with a violation of air pollution standards ranged from 
1 in a typical year to 105. 
So when public goods are provided locally, households have a better 
opportunity to find a good fit for their needs and wants. But having 
choices means more than just a good match between household tastes 
and supplied amenities. It means that nobody is beholden to his or her 
city. If a city performs poorly, people can vote with their feet and leave. 
As with a competitive market, the possibility that people can choose a 
competitor disciplines cities to be at their best. 
E. Market Discipline 
We now come to the final step in the logic. As economist William 
Fischel has emphasized, a local jurisdiction can be compared to a 
for-profit corporation.36 Like a corporation’s board of directors that 
must deliver profits to maximize shareholder value, a municipal 
corporation’s mayors and councilors will be driven to deliver an efficient 
 
35. Holger Sieg et al., Estimating the General Equilibrium Effects of Large 
Changes in Spatially Delineated Public Goods, 45 INT’L ECON. REV. 1047 
(2004). 
36. WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: HOW HOME 
VALUES INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL 
FINANCE, AND LAND-USE POLICIES 19 (2001); William A. Fischel, A 
Theory of Municipal Corporate Governance with an Application to Land-
Use Regulation, in A COMPANION TO URBAN ECONOMICS 372 (Richard 
J. Arnott & Daniel P. McMillen eds., 2006).  
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government and appropriate mix of public goods to maximize its 
property values. Moreover, the shareholders of the municipal 
corporation are much more likely to actively monitor and police 
municipal leaders. Homes are by far the single most important 
investment for most people. Homeownership rates are still about 65.4% 
(down from a high of 69.1% before the Great Recession) and up to 
eighty percent of Americans own a home at some point in their lives.37 
Moreover, even after the recent housing bust, the typical home-owning 
household has forty-nine percent of its wealth tied up in its home.38 
From an investment perspective, this means most homeowners have a 
lot of their wealth in one basket, and they are wise to watch that basket 
very carefully.39 
Thus, the “price” for public goods really plays a dual role. On the 
one hand, it is the price for joining the “club” of a jurisdiction and 
enjoying its local public services. As with private goods, this price 
efficiently allocates services to those households that are willing to pay 
for them. On the other hand, the price here also is an asset for those 
households who have already purchased their membership in the 
jurisdiction, which provides an incentive for them to maximize their 
property values by ensuring their jurisdiction is efficiently run. 
And the evidence is that homeowners do just that. One survey 
found that homeowners were more likely to know the school 
superintendent, know their U.S. House Representative, vote in local 
elections, and participate in community organizations; moreover, the 
same individuals appear to be more active citizens in this regard once 
they become homeowners.40 In this way, citizens have a stake in the 
success of their communities and they actively oversee local politics to 
ensure that success. 
F. Empirical Evidence 
There is ample evidence that a robust market is at play in just this 
way. My colleague Randall Walsh and I recently looked at the 
demographic effects around large industrial facilities with high levels of 
 
37. Press Release, Robert R. Callis & Melissa Kresin, U.S. Census Bureau 
News, Residential Vacancies and Homeownership in the Fourth Quarter 
2012 (Jan. 29, 2013), available at http://www.census.gov/housing/ 
hvs/files/qtr412/q412press.pdf. 
38. This figure was computed by dividing the 2011 mean value of equity in 
owner-occupied homes, among homeowners, by the mean net worth of 
homeowners. See Detailed Tables on Wealth and Asset Ownership, U.S. 
Census Bureau, http://www.census.gov/people/wealth/data/ 
dtables.html (follow “2011” hyperlink; then select Table 5) (last visited 
Mar. 3, 2014). 
39. Fischel, supra note 36. 
40. Denise DiPasquale & Edward L. Glaeser, Incentives and Social Capital: 
Are Homeowners Better Citizens? 45 J. URB. ECON. 354, 356 (1999). 
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air pollution. We looked at very local effects in small neighborhoods 
defined at a scale of a half-mile. We found that neighborhoods within 
a half mile of these polluting facilities lost 10–12 percent of their 
population between 1990 and 2000, compared to other neighborhoods. 
Neighborhoods with a new polluting facility lost 8–12 percent of their 
population. And neighborhoods where the polluting facility either shut 
down or substantially cleaned up had a 4–6 percent increase in 
population compared to other neighborhoods.41 
Some may object on the grounds that it seems unlikely people 
would move just because of small changes in public goods or tax rates. 
In fact, we do find greater turnover in neighborhoods following these 
kinds of changes in their character (for good or ill). But more 
importantly, it isn’t really necessary for people to move because of such 
changes. People move anyway, with over thirty-five percent of 
Americans moving in a five year period, a very high rate.42 This mobility 
creates a constant churning that allows the demographic composition 
of communities to evolve rapidly along with changing public services. 
So long as people look at amenities, taxes, and housing prices when 
they do move, the demand for housing will be systematically higher in 
well-run communities. It is also worth noting that the distribution of 
job locations does not appear to restrict households’ choices about 
where to live within a metropolitan area. We seem quite willing to 
commute if necessary to obtain our preferred residential community.43 
In addition to turnover and other such demographic adjustments 
to changes in public goods, there is strong evidence that the higher 
demand for public goods is “capitalized” into higher housing prices. By 
the same token, lower demand for a community translates into lower 
prices. For example, nobody likes to pay taxes. So intuitively, 
communities with higher tax burdens are less desirable, other things 
equal. But estimating this effect empirically requires overcoming some 
statistical challenges, because higher taxes tend to go with higher 
expenditures on services. Consequently, it is not enough to just compare 
housing prices in high-tax communities to prices in low-tax 
communities. 
However, economists have identified the effect by focusing on cases 
where higher taxes are paid without a corresponding increase in 
services. For example, one study compared otherwise identical houses 
in a Houston subdivision, but which differed in the year that they were 
 
41. H. Spencer Banzhaf & Randall P. Walsh, Do People Vote with their Feet? 
An Empirical Test of Tiebout’s Mechanism, 98 AM. ECON. REV. 843 
(2008). 
42. Data on Geographical Mobility/Migration, U.S. Census Bureau, 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/migration/data/cps/cps2010-5yr.html 
(follow “Table 1: United States” hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 3, 2014).  
43. Bruce W. Hamilton, Wasteful Commuting, 90 J. POL. ECON. 1035 (1982). 
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built. Because prevailing interest rates changed over time, even many 
years later taxes to pay down debt on water and sewer infrastructure 
were different for these houses. And these differences were capitalized 
into the housing prices.44 Other studies have found that older homes in 
California, exempt from higher taxes under the state’s Proposition 13 
but still entitled to full schooling and other services, command a price 
premium over newer homes with higher tax rates.45 Even future tax 
liabilities appear to be capitalized into housing values: one study found 
that greater municipal pension liabilities are associated with lower 
housing values.46 
On the other side of the coin are the amenities and public services 
we enjoy. In the same way that taxes are associated with lower housing 
prices, high-quality public goods and natural amenities are associated 
with higher prices. Intuitively, we all understand that houses are more 
expensive in a strong school district than in a weaker one. In two recent 
studies conducted in Massachusetts and San Francisco, economists have 
compared homes just on one side of a school attendance zone to homes 
just across the boundary. Comparing communities, they found that a 
five percent improvement in test scores leads to a one-to-two percentage 
point increase in housing prices.47 If anything this seems low, but there 
are reasons to suspect these estimates may well be a lower bound on 
the effect of schools on property values, if households feared that the 
attendance zones would change in the future.48 Crucially, these 
capitalization effects occur for environmental amenities as well as for 
school quality. For example, communities with five percent less air 
pollution are associated with a two percent increase in housing prices.49 
 
44. Oded Palmon & Barton A. Smith, New Evidence on Property Tax 
Capitalization, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1099 (1998). 
45. A. Quang Do & C. F. Sirmans, Residential Property Tax Capitalization: 
Discount Rate Evidence from California, 47 NAT’L TAX J. 341 (1994). 
46. Dennis Epple & Katherine Schipper, Municipal Pension Funding: A 
Theory and Some Evidence, 37 PUB. CHOICE 141 (1981). 
47. Patrick Bayer et al., A Unified Framework for Measuring Preferences for 
Schools and Neighborhoods, 115 J. POL. ECON. 588 (2007); Sandra E. 
Black, Do Better Schools Matter?: Parental Valuation of Elementary 
Education, 114 Q. J. ECON. 577 (1999). For an alternative approach to 
estimating such capitalization, see Dennis Epple & Holger Sieg, 
Estimating Equilibrium Models of Local Jurisdictions, 107 J. POL. ECON. 
645 (1999). 
48. Chris Mothorpe, The Impact of Uncertainty on School Quality 
Capitalization Using the Border Method (October 2013) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://aysps.gsu.edu/sites/default/files/ 
documents/The%20Impact%20of%20Uncertainty%20on%20School%20Q
uality%20Capitilization%20Using%20the%20Border%20Method.pdf. 
49. Patrick Bayer et al., Migration and Hedonic Valuation: The Case of Air 
Quality, 58 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 1 (2009); Kenneth Y. Chay & 
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Additionally, numerous studies document that housing prices are lower 
near landfills and hazardous waste sites.50 
More interestingly, in all these cases—education, air quality, and 
hazardous waste—new information or new reforms leads to sudden 
changes in local housing prices. For example, in recent work I have 
shown that a perceived break-up of the enormous, unwieldy, and much-
loathed Los Angeles Unified School District led to a two-to-five 
percentage point increase in housing prices in the district over the 
following six months, compared to nearby areas.51  
Similarly, from 1999–2001, an outbreak of fifteen cases of acute 
lymphocytic leukemia occurred in Churchill County, NV, out of a total 
population of about 24,000, about four times the typical level.52 As 
Lucas Davis has shown, this “cancer cluster” led to a substantial decline 
in housing prices, of about fifteen percent, right after the publication of 
these cases.53 The following figure illustrates this effect. These kinds of 
rapid capitalization effects indicate that people are playing close 
attention to local conditions, and that they respond to those conditions 
by voting with their feet. 
 
 
 
Michael Greenstone, Does Air Quality Matter? Evidence from the Housing 
Market, 113 J. POL. ECON. 376 (2005). 
50. See generally H. Spencer Banzhaf & Eleanor McCormick, Moving Beyond 
Cleanup: Identifying the Crucibles of Environmental Gentrification, in 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 23 (H. Spencer 
Banzhaf ed., 2012). 
51. H. Spencer Banzhaf & Garima Bhalla, Do Households Prefer Small School 
Districts?: A Natural Experiment, 78 S. ECON. J. 819, 837 (2012). 
52.  Lucas W. Davis, The Effect of Health Risk on Housing Values: Evidence 
from a Cancer Cluster, 94 Am. Econ. Rev. 1693, 1694 (2004). 
53. Id. at 1701–02. 
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Figure 2: Effect of 1999–2001 Cancer Cluster on Housing Prices in 
Churchill County, NV Compared to Control Group 
Source: Lucas W. Davis, The Effect of Health Risk on Housing 
Values: Evidence from a Cancer Cluster 94 American Economic 
Review 1693 (2004). 
So far we have considered two kinds of evidence that a market is 
at work in public services: direct mobility by households and 
capitalization of amenities, services, and taxes into housing prices. A 
third and final type of evidence is more indirect. A general rule of 
markets is that, for obvious reasons, richer people tend to buy more of 
the good things in life. By the same token, numerous studies have 
shown that richer households live in more expensive communities with 
higher levels of public goods.54 Others have found that metropolitan 
areas with more school districts are more segregated by income levels 
across districts.55 This makes sense: where there is a monopoly, 
everybody has to buy the same product; where there is more choice, 
different people choose different products. That is, people sort 
themselves out by their demand for public goods when given the 
opportunity to do so. Markets for public goods look like markets for 
private goods, with richer people able to afford to purchase more of the 
good things in life. 
 
54. Epple & Sieg, supra note 47, at 648, 671; Sieg et al., supra note 35, at 
1067. 
55. Randall W. Eberts & Timothy J. Gronberg, Jurisdictional Homogeneity 
and the Tiebout Hypothesis, 10 J. URB. ECON. 227, 238 (1981). 
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In summary, because of market incentives, better-run cities have 
higher property values and a larger tax base. They get it right in two 
ways. First, efficient cities get the most services for their tax dollar. 
Second, they hit the sweet spot in the trade-off between the benefits of 
public services and the cost of taxes. A city with very low taxes but 
very low services will struggle with crime, school quality, potholes and 
other issues, and citizens will be willing to pay higher taxes to obtain 
those services. Another city might go too far in the other direction, 
taxing away a dollar to pay for excessive services that citizens value 
less than a dollar. The best-run city will strike the right balance for  
its citizens. 
III. Potential Flies in the Ointment 
In the previous section, I argued that local public goods can be 
efficiently provided, just like private goods. Households must purchase 
them at a price, just as they do private goods. And local governments 
have an incentive to efficiently provide them, as private corporations 
do for private goods. In this section, I consider three potentially 
important caveats to this argument, two related to the types of taxes 
used to finance local public goods and one related to renters. 
A. Property Taxes 
The first fly in Tiebout’s ointment—and the one of particular 
concern in this paper—is the fact that, realistically, jurisdictions cannot 
use head taxes to finance public goods. Instead, they must use an 
alternative fiscal instrument such as the property tax or a land tax. 
This in turn gives rise to two potential problems. 
1. Jurisdictional Choice Externalities 
The first potential problem is a “jurisdictional choice externality,” 
in which too many people try to crowd into a community when they 
do not bear the full cost of public services.56 As discussed in Section II.B, 
this dynamic is problematic if public goods are congested, so that when 
an additional household enters a jurisdiction it either subtracts from 
the benefit received by others or requires additional funding  
or regulation. 
A jurisdictional choice externality can arise in at least two ways. 
The first way this can arise is if there are increasing marginal costs of 
serving an additional resident with a given level of the public good. 
Suppose, for example, as discussed previously, the marginal cost of 
maintaining a given level of air quality in a community is increasing. 
(At first, adding additional population has little effect, but then 
increasingly severe regulatory burdens would be required to maintain a 
given level of air quality.) This situation is again depicted in Figure 3.  
56. The idea is an old one, but to my knowledge the term was coined by 
Calabrese et al., supra note 26, at 1082. 
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The optimal population size for the community is at the first vertical 
line, where the marginal benefits to households of living in the 
jurisdiction (the horizontal dashed line) are just equal to the marginal 
cost of adding an additional household (the solid curve).  
 
Figure 3. Jurisdictional Choice Externality 
 
However, the tax and/or regulatory burdens of maintaining the 
public goods are evenly distributed among all members of the 
jurisdiction. Accordingly, households do not pay the marginal cost, they 
pay the average cost (the dashed curve). At the optimal population 
size, the marginal benefit to an additional household of moving into the 
jurisdiction is higher than the average cost, so more households would 
continue to move in, until the marginal benefit is equal to the average 
cost, at the second vertical line. But these additional households impose 
a cost on the community that is much higher than the benefit they 
receive from living there. It is this burden on others which is meant by 
the jurisdiction choice externality and which can potentially lead to 
overcrowding.57 If head taxes were available, they could serve to price 
 
57. See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMICS OF ZONING LAWS: A PROPERTY 
RIGHTS APPROACH TO AMERICAN LAND USE CONTROLS 294–96 (1985) 
(describing the costs and benefits associated with an increase in 
population). 
Population
Marginal Cost Avg Cost
Marginal Benefit
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the congestion imposed by other people and limit entry, but property 
taxes are a blunt way to do this, as they tax property, not congestion.58 
Even if marginal costs and average costs are constant, so that there 
is no divergence between the two as depicted in Figure 3, there is a 
second way the jurisdictional choice externality can arise. The second 
way a jurisdictional choice externality can arise is when poorer 
households try to buy small houses in richer neighborhoods. In such 
cases, the entry into the community of a resident transfers funds from 
richer households (with larger houses and, hence, greater property tax 
burdens) to poorer households. In this way, poorer households are 
essentially free riding (or “easy riding”59) off richer houses in the 
financing of public goods. Although they get the same parks and schools 
as the richer residents in the community, they pay less because they 
consume less real estate. 
Because they are subsidized by richer households in the jurisdiction, 
poorer households will vote for higher public good levels. Unfortunately, 
by the same token, because public goods would thereby serve as a 
transfer payment rather than a pure public good, richer households will 
respond by voting for lower tax rates and public good levels. 
Alternatively, they may leave the jurisdiction altogether. This creates 
a potential dynamic in which poorer households chase richer ones and 
richer ones try to flee. The upshot of the problem is that public goods 
financing becomes a redistributive transfer. And though the provision 
of public goods has the potential to work well locally, a standard result 
in public finance is that income transfers do not.60 
The jurisdictional choice externality can be viewed as a case of the 
“tragedy of the commons,” with too many people crowding into a 
jurisdiction to take advantage of its tax base. 
2. Capital Distortions 
A second potential problem, highlighted by proponents of the so-
called “new view” of the property tax, is that the property tax distorts 
the allocation of capital, with residents in high-tax communities 
building less intensively in response to the tax.61 If so, this would change 
 
58. A blunt way, but not totally ineffectual. See John Douglas Wilson, 
Property Taxation, Congestion, and Local Public Goods, 64 J. PUB. ECON. 
207, 208 (2007). 
59. Cornes & Sandler, supra note 2, at 30. 
60. OATES, supra note 3, at 190 (“[T]he mobility of economic units prevents 
any particular locality from embarking on an aggressive redistributive 
program because of the likelihood that those from whom income is being 
transferred will relocate in areas where they can obtain more favorable 
fiscal treatment.”). 
61. Peter Mieszkowski, The Property Tax: An Excise Tax or a Profits Tax?, 
1 J. Pub. Econ. 73, 74 (1972). See generally, George R. Zodrow, 
Reflections of the New View and the Benefit View of the Property Tax, 
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the interpretation of the price people pay for public goods. Insofar as it 
includes property taxes, the price would not be just a way to allocate 
public goods to the households with the highest willingness to pay, 
while covering the cost of supplying public goods. In other words, it 
would not be a “benefit tax”—a price paid for the benefits of public 
goods. It would distort other, unrelated decisions, like how large a house 
to build on the land.  
In a recent simulation exercise, Stephen Calabrese and co-authors 
have found that both issues are problematic, but that the jurisdictional 
choice externality is the greater concern.62 In fact, in their simulations, 
the jurisdictional choice externality entirely negates any gain from 
Tiebout sorting processes, with households better off with a single 
community—that is, with no menu of choices over taxes and public 
good levels. Nevertheless, elements of the Tiebout model remain even 
with these distortions.63 In particular, under certain conditions, 
households still sort across communities based on their demand  
for public goods and public good levels will be capitalized into  
housing prices. 
Note that both these potential problems stem from the use of the 
property tax. If head taxes were available, as Tiebout originally 
envisioned, the transfer would not occur. Poorer households would pay 
the same as richer households, regardless of their housing consumption. 
Similarly, the congestion would not occur. The head tax would serve as 
a congestion tax, serving as a mechanism to exclude over-consumption 
of the local public good by pricing entry. That is, while the head tax 
serves as the club “gate,” the property tax seemingly distorts housing 
consumption. For that reason, the taxes in Tiebout’s model are 
sometimes called a “benefit” tax, they are a price paid to receive the 
benefits of living in a community, whereas under the “new” view the 
tax falls on capital. 
B. Renters 
Although it is not the centerpiece of this paper, another set of 
potential problems with Tiebout’s defense of local public goods is the 
role of renters. As discussed above, when citizens are homeowners, they 
 
in PROPERTY TAXATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE: ESSAYS IN 
HONOR OF C. LOWELL HARRIS 79 (Wallace E. Oates ed., 2001). One 
alternative to the property tax that would not have this second problem 
is the land tax. See, e.g., LAND VALUE TAXATION: CAN IT AND WILL IT 
WORK TODAY? (Dick Netzer ed., 1998). 
62. Calabrese et al., supra note 26, at 1083. 
63. See Dennis Epple et al., Equilibrium Among Local Jurisdictions: Toward 
an Integrated Treatment of Voting and Residential Choice, 24 J. PUB. 
ECON. 281, 282 (1984); George R. Zodrow & Peter M. Mieszkowski, The 
New View of the Property Tax: A Reformulation, 16 REGIONAL SCI. & 
URB. ECON. 309, 313 (1986). 
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have an important incentive to monitor their community and insure 
that it is efficiently run. That incentive is to maintain their property 
values. However, although the majority of Americans are homeowners, 
about a third are renters.64 In many cities, the proportion is much 
higher, ranging up to about half in New York and Los Angeles (the 
highest in the U.S.).65 And, indeed, renting is a perfectly logical choice 
for households who are credit constrained, who may expect to move in 
the near future and do not want to pay the transaction costs of buying 
and selling a house for a short tenure, or who otherwise do not want to 
bear the risk of owning such a large financial asset. 
Recall that the price of land plays a dual role in our argument. The 
first is its role in allocating local public goods. In this respect, renters 
pay the same kind of price that homeowners do to enter a community. 
For the same reason we expect property values to be higher in cities 
with nice amenities, we expect rents to be higher too. This means that 
the price mechanism still works for allocating public goods to renters 
as well as to homeowners. However, the second role played by the price 
is as an incentive to insure that cities are efficiently run. Here, the logic 
breaks down in the case of renters. If inefficiency causes local taxes to 
be higher without a compensating increase in services, renters will 
simply require lower rents to live in the city.66 Landlords will be worse 
off, but the renters will be indifferent to the inefficiency.67 This is 
consistent with the evidence that renters are less informed about local 
politics.68 Unfortunately, it means that cities with large numbers of 
renters may not be run as efficiently. 
IV. The Role of Zoning 
In this section, I will argue that despite the potential problems 
posed by congested public goods and the property tax, discussed in the 
previous section, local zoning and other ordinances can restore the 
competitive efficiency of local public goods. 
 
64. Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 37, at 4 tbl.3. 
65. Homeownership Rates for the 75 Largest Metropolitan Statistical Areas: 
2005 to 2013, U.S. Census Bureau, http://www.census.gov/housing/ 
hvs/data/rates/tab6_msa_05_2013_hmr.xls (last visited Mar. 1, 2014). 
66. H. Spencer Banzhaf & Wallace E. Oates, On Fiscal Illusion in Local 
Public Finance: Re-Examining Ricardian Equivalence and the Renter 
Effect, 66 NAT’L TAX J. 511, 513–14, 532–34 (2013); Jorge 
Martinez-Vazquez & David L. Sjoquist, Property Tax Financing, Renting, 
and the Level of Local Expenditures, 55 S. ECON. J. 424, 429 (1988). 
67  Martinez-Vazquez & Sjoquist, supra note 66, at 428. 
68. DiPasquale & Glaeser, supra note 40, at 356. 
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A. Prices under the Consensus View 
As a matter of logic, if—and as I will argue below, this is a big 
“if”—housing capital and lot sizes quickly adjust to new conditions, 
then land and housing prices will be approximately equal within a 
jurisdiction in equilibrium, regardless of any distortions in the number 
of residents and size of housing. If small lots were more valuable per 
unit than large lots, lots would be readjusted so that there would be 
more small ones. Low-value land added to larger lots would be removed 
and used to create new small lots. If the reverse were true and large 
lots were more valuable per unit than small lots, small lots would be 
merged to increase the total value. 
Accordingly, in what Ross and Yinger call the “consensus view,” 
land will have a constant price within a community, but be more 
expensive (gross of taxes) in high-public-good communities.69 The 
relationship is illustrated in Figure 4A. Here, all prices go through the 
origin (an infinitesimally small lot has infinitesimal value), but the 
marginal cost of a larger house is higher in high-public-good 
communities. Algebraically, the price of a lot i, of a given size, in 
community j can be written: 
(1)Priceij = aj*sizeij 
The term aj represents the community-specific cost of land, which is 
increasing in public goods; it represents the slope of the lines in 
Figure 4A. In other words, from this perspective, there is no distinction 
between the pricing of uncongested or congested public goods as we 
made in Section II.B. Both types of public goods are capitalized in the 
gross-of-tax price of the weak complement, real estate.  
 
69. Stephen Ross & John Yinger, Sorting and Voting: A Review of the 
Literature on Urban Public Finance, in 3 HANDBOOK OF REGIONAL AND 
URBAN ECONOMICS 2001, 2027 (Paul Cheshire & Edwin S. Mills eds., 
1999). 
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Figure 4A: Pricing in Consensus View 
Figure 4B: Pricing under Hamilton (1976) 
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But these are precisely the conditions discussed in the previous 
section that seem to undermine Tiebout’s argument that there is a 
market-like process in public goods. These are the conditions that lead 
to the jurisdictional choice externality and capital distortions discussed 
above. Namely, there is no gate price for entry to the community, only 
marginal pricing for capital. 
B. Prices as a Two-Part Tariff 
Bruce Hamilton extended Tiebout’s model to account for the 
distortions otherwise caused by the unavailability of head taxes and to 
lend the benefit interpretation to property taxes (or regulations). In the 
simplest version of the argument, he noted that zoning regulations, such 
as minimum lot sizes or height restrictions, can prevent such distortions 
by preventing too many people from crowding into a community: with 
lot sizes fixed, there is a limit to how many housing units could fit in a 
jurisdiction.70 Similarly, zoning restrictions on housing units can 
prevent capital distortions. Minimum house sizes (or minimum 
standards for the quality and style of construction) can prevent the 
distortion of the property tax, which otherwise would lead to lower 
levels of housing capital.  
In a variant of his argument, Hamilton also noted that the same 
outcome could arise even with heterogeneity in lot sizes, as long as the 
distribution of houses was fixed.71 For example, a jurisdiction might 
reserve a certain share of housing for “small” houses (or low-income 
housing) and zone the remainder for “large” houses. Or, perhaps a range 
of lot sizes and house sizes emerged in a jurisdiction historically, for 
whatever reason, but those configurations remain largely fixed over 
very long time periods because of transaction costs. Once parcels are 
subdivided at some point in history, it is quite costly to change those 
divisions, especially if housing capital and infrastructure are already 
developed.  
Figure 4B illustrates this second variant of Hamilton’s model. The 
point labeled C1 represents a homogenous community of all small 
houses; likewise the point C4 represents a homogenous community of 
all big houses. C2 and C3 represent communities with mixed housing 
bundles, but in which the quantity of each house type is zoned (or 
otherwise fixed). In both mixed communities, larger houses must be 
more expensive than smaller houses. But a small house in C2 has an 
advantage over an equal-sized house in C1 because it enjoys the tax 
base of the larger houses in C2. Hence, it is more expensive. By the 
same token, the large house in C3 has a disadvantage relative to a 
 
70. Bruce W. Hamilton, Zoning and Property Taxation in a System of Local 
Governments, 12 URB. STUD. 205 (1975). 
71. Bruce W. Hamilton, Capitalization of Intrajurisdictional Differences in 
Local Tax Prices, 66 AM. ECON. REV. 743, 747–49 (1976). For discussion, 
see FISCHEL, supra note 36, at 39–71. 
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comparable house in C4 because it must subsidize public goods for 
residents pulling down the tax base. Hence, it is less expensive. Likewise 
for a comparison of houses across C2 and C3. The crucial consequence 
of all this is a tilting of the marginal cost of land within C2 and C3: 
even if the marginal cost of land is constant within a community, as 
illustrated here by the straight lines connecting the points, the average 
cost (i.e. total cost divided by the lot size) is not constant. 
Mathematically, prices must be computed with a community-specific 
intercept as well as a (constant) cost of land: (2) Priceij = αj + a0*sizeij, 
where here the αj are increasing in public goods. Under optimal zoning, 
if all land is of constant quality, a0 is the same everywhere. For reasons 
discussed above, if the non-rivalrous amenities differ, the a’s will still 
differ across communities, as would be appropriate to account for the 
scarcity of land. 
This “tilting” in the price functions has at least three 
interpretations. First, as explained by Hamilton, zoning plays the role 
of a head tax.72 Although there is no head tax per se, households still 
must pay a fixed entry “ticket” to the community through the housing 
price, followed by a marginal cost for larger lots.73 Each jurisdiction will 
have its own “ticket” price that internalizes the congestion externality 
at that location. A second interpretation comes from the literature on 
nonlinear pricing.74 A well-established result in that literature is that 
minimum purchase requirements are equivalent to a two-part tariff: 
here, the two parts are the entry fee plus the marginal price of land.75 
Such pricing schemes are optimal whenever there is a fixed cost of 
serving an additional customer (such as the jurisdictional choice 
externality).76 A third interpretation comes from the literature on 
shadow pricing and rationing.77 When some households are rationed 
into larger houses than they would otherwise choose, the equilibrium 
can be supported “as if” by a lower cost of land, paired with a 
downward adjustment to income to offset the income effect of those 
lower prices. This adjustment to “virtual income” is equivalent to the 
entry ticket. 
 
72.  See Hamilton, supra note 71 at 749. 
73. Id. at 750. 
74. See generally ROBERT WILSON, NONLINEAR PRICING 136–41 (1993) 
(discussing the nonlinear pricing and the two-part tariff). 
75.  Id. 
76. See id. at 136. 
77. See generally J.P. Neary & K.W.S. Roberts, The Theory of Household 
Behaviour under Rationing, 13 EUR. ECON. REV. 25 (1980) (discussing 
how duality theory and virtual prices can be used to analyze household 
behavior under rationing). 
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C. Empirical Evidence 
A large literature has debated the relative merits of the assumptions 
of these models and purported to empirically test one or the other.78 
Unfortunately, many of these tests are unsatisfying.79 Consider, for 
example, the issue of capitalization. Some argue that “capitalization is 
everywhere” and that this is consistent with the benefit view.80 Others 
argue that capitalization is still consistent with the new view of the 
property tax, insofar as it incorporates Tiebout-like sorting processes.81 
Still others have gone farther and argued that, since in Hamilton’s 
model the price of homogenous land is constant everywhere, evidence 
that housing prices capitalize public good levels contradicts the benefit 
view.82 Indeed, Ross and Yinger call such evidence “overwhelming.”83 
In fact, the participants in this debate appear to be talking past 
one another. The question is not really whether public good levels are 
capitalized, but how they are capitalized. In the consensus view, the αj 
of Equation (2) are all zero: there are no entry tickets, no intercepts as 
in Figure 4B. Capitalization occurs only through slope effects, as in 
Figure 4A. As discussed in Section II, that kind of pricing is perfectly 
appropriate if public goods are uncongested. But if public goods are 
congested, that kind of pricing fails to close the commons and leads to 
overcrowding of the community. Under Hamilton’s model, with optimal 
zoning and homogenous land (and no uncongested public goods), the 
marginal price of land is the same everywhere: the aj of Equation (1) 
are all equal. Capitalization occurs through the intercepts as in 
Figure 4B, as would be appropriate for congested public goods. Thus, 
the question should be whether capitalization reveals itself in a higher 
 
78. See FISCHEL, supra note 36, at 39–71; William A. Fischel, Municipal 
Corporations, Homeowners and the Benefit View of the Property Tax, in 
PROPERTY TAXATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE: ESSAYS IN 
HONOR OF C. LOWELL HARRIS 33 (Wallace E. Oates ed., 2001) (discussing 
the merits of the benefit view); Zodrow, supra note 61 (discussing the 
merits of the new view); Thomas J. Nechyba, The Benefit View and the 
New View: Where Do We Stand, Twenty-Five Years into the Debate?, in 
PROPERTY TAXATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE: ESSAYS IN 
HONOR OF C. LOWELL HARRIS 113 (Wallace E. Oates ed., 2001) 
(comparing the different views taken by the Zodrow and Fischel models); 
Ross & Yinger, supra note 69 (presenting evidence in support of the new 
view). 
79. See Nechyba, supra note 71. 
80. Fischel, supra note 79, at 56. 
81. See Zodrow, supra note 61, at 91; Nehyba, supra note 79, at 119 (stating 
that there is a role for capitalization in either view).  
82.  Ross & Yinger, supra note 69, at 2018–19. 
83. Id. at 2043. 
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marginal cost of land or a fixed entry ticket; whether it is in the slopes 
of Figure 4A or the intercepts of Figure 4B or a little bit of both. 
Unfortunately, to my knowledge, virtually all of the papers that 
been interpreted as disproving the benefit view do so only under 
maintained hypotheses that rule out the two-part pricing inherent in 
Hamilton’s model.84 Most notably, this includes any hedonic study, such 
as all those discussed by Ross and Yinger, that uses logged housing 
prices as the dependent variable. In all such models, the price of a unit 
of housing is constant in each community and given by aj (recovered as 
the exponent of the community-specific intercepts in the semilog 
model).85 Although some of these models do allow for flexible functional 
form relationships between prices and housing quantity, invariably the 
studies interpret the flexible function of land and capital as a non-linear 
quantity index of housing, with the exponentiated community-specific 
intercepts as the constant price-per-unit of this quantity index.86 Thus, 
the models either literally force a linear price through the origin as in 
Figure 4A, or rescale the axis-axis so that is true in renormalized 
“quantity space.”  
Accordingly, these models cannot be viewed as proper tests of 
Hamilton’s model, because if the benefit view as articulated by 
Hamilton is correct, then they are mis-specified because they rule out 
the tilting shown in Figure 4B. Simply by eyeballing this figure, it is 
obvious that if one fits Equation (1) to it, one will force capitalization 
into the price function. Indeed, I have found in simulations that a 
semilog model can obtain a very strong fit, even to data that are 
generated from a Tiebout-Hamilton-Fischel process, with uniform 
marginal prices of land across jurisdictions and entry tickets. A similar 
issue arises in the model of Carroll and Yinger, which again restricts 
the price of housing to be constant.87 None of this is to say that we have  
84. For discussion of an important exception, see Byron F. Lutz, Fiscal 
Amenities, School Finance Reform and the Supply Side of the Tiebout 
Market (Fed. Res. Bd., Working Paper No. 2009-18, 2009). Lutz finds 
that decreases in the fiscal transfers within a community result in 
increases in housing capital. Id. at 23–25, 28–29. On the face of it, this is 
inconsistent with a simple zoning story in which capital is fixed. However, 
this too is not a clean test. For example, it may not be inconsistent with 
a story in which jurisdictions have minimum constraints on housing size, 
constraints which may over time either no longer bind or be adjusted 
upward to bind at a higher level of capital. 
85. For an overview of this literature, see H. Spencer Banzhaf & Omar 
Farooque, Interjurisdictional Housing Prices and Spatial Amenities: 
Which Measures of Housing Prices Reflect Local Public Goods?, 43 
REGIONAL SCI. & URB. ECON. 635 (2013). For prominent examples, see 
Bayer et al., supra note 49; Sieg et al., supra note 35. 
86. See sources cited supra note 85. 
87. Robert J. Carroll & John Yinger, Is the Property Tax a Benefit Tax?: 
The Case of Rental Housing, 47 NAT’L TAX J. 295, 305 (1994). 
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not gained important insights from these models. But insofar as they 
rule out the benefit view by assumption, they are not tests of that view, 
properly speaking. 
A second fact that has been suggested to undermine the benefit 
view is the surprising degree of income heterogeneity within 
jurisdictions, which is greater than one might expect if the jurisdictional 
choice externality were being controlled with zoning. Empirical sorting 
models, for example, explain this result with dispersed distributions of 
unobserved tastes for public goods, tastes which often are estimated to 
be slightly negatively correlated with income.88 However, this result 
may be forced on the models through the mis-specification of assuming 
price relationships like Figure 4A. Essentially, the models must confront 
the fact that some households are (seemingly) willing to live in a 
community with low public goods along with poorer households yet are 
rich enough to afford a very large house at constant prices. The models 
explain this by assigning them low tastes for public goods, so that they 
are not willing to join a richer community, and high income. However, 
an alternative explanation, consistent with Hamilton’s model, is that in 
fact they are paying a lower price for per-unit housing in that 
community than assumed by the model, as illustrated by Figure 4B. 
That is, perhaps some richer households are in lower-ranked 
communities, not because of a low unobserved taste for public goods, 
but because they pay less for the large houses there (per unit). 
There is no doubt some truth to both the benefit view and the new 
view.89 Accordingly, in this paper I account for both through the 
following model: (3)Priceij = αj + aj*lotsizeij + β0*housingcapitalij + eij. 
This model includes both community-specific intercept effects (the αj) 
and community-specific slope effects on the value of land (the aj), plus 
adjustments for a vector of housing capital characteristics.90 If the αj 
are all zero, the model is equivalent to the standard view and the notion 
of entry tickets to a community, which are fundamental to Hamilton’s 
model, is rejected. If the aj are all equal, the marginal cost of housing 
is the same across communities, which would be consistent with 
Hamilton’s model with optimal zoning and only congested public goods. 
If neither is true—as seems most likely—there is some pricing of public 
goods through entry tickets and some through differential marginal 
costs for land and housing. A further question would be whether 
 
88. See, e.g., Epple & Sieg, supra note 47. 
89. Nechyba, supra note 79, at 119. 
90. Capital controls include cubics of the house square footage and age, plus 
interactions, a complete set of dummies for numbers of bedrooms and 
bathrooms, fully interacted with each other and with square footage, a 
dummy for the presence of a swimming pool, and a cubic in the date of 
sale (to control for price appreciation over the time window). 
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congested public goods are more likely to be capitalized in the intercepts 
(αj) and uncongested amenities into the slopes (aj). 
I estimate Equation (3) using 73,324 actual housing transactions in 
the Los Angeles MSA from 1999 to 2001.91 As definitions of the j 
communities, I use 170 high school attendance zones. Figure 5A shows 
one illustrative case, for Beverly Hills. The vertical axis shows the net 
value of land, i.e. Priceij -β0*housingcapitalij, and the horizontal axis 
shows lot size. The figure plots individual data points and two 
functional forms fit to the data. The steep line going through the origin 
restricts αj = 0. It rules out any “ticket” prices to enter the community. 
The flatter line shows the tilting when we allow intercepts as well as 
slopes. Clearly, there is a large intercept effect here. Figure 5B shows 
the same relationships for a much poorer neighborhood in the Watts 
community of south Los Angeles. Although there are still intercept 
effects here, as one might expect they are much smaller than for Beverly 
Hills: the price of admission into this community is simply much lower. 
 
Figure 5A: Estimated Intercept and Slope for Beverly Hills 
 
91. For a summary of these data, see Banzhaf and Farooque, supra note 85. 
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Figure 5B: Estimated Intercept and Slope for Watts 
 
Overall, the model rejects the hypothesis that the αj = 0 and can 
be omitted from the model at the one-percent level of statistical 
significance. Likewise, it rejects the hypothesis that the aj = 0 and can 
be omitted from the model at the one-percent level. Thus, there appear  
Figure 6: Estimated Intercept and Slope Effects, by Community 
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to be both intercept and slope effects, as one would expect if there is a 
mix of congested and uncongested public goods. Figure 6 summarizes 
the results of the model, by plotting the estimated intercepts against 
the estimated slopes for all 170 LA communities. The figure shows a 
large number of communities with intercept effects and small slope 
effects, bunched to the left of the figure. A few communities, to the 
lower right of the figure, show the opposite. Overall, there is little 
pattern in the two effects, with a correlation of -0.04. 
Of course, one might argue that even the model allowing for 
intercept and slope effects is too restricted, in that it requires all effects 
to be linear. One might argue instead that there are no intercept effects 
per se, but just non-linear effects in lot size. Figure 7 illustrates the 
argument. It shows, for one illustrative community, the models with 
linear slope effects, with an intercept and linear slope effects, and two 
common non-linear models, the translog and the Box-Cox. These non-
linear models have a very steep slope at first, effectively eliminating the 
need for the intercept. However, for most of the range of the data, they 
are practically indistinguishable from the model with intercept effects. 
 
Figure 7: Non-linear Functional Forms 
 
For this reason, I view the non-linearity argument as a semantic, 
rather than substantive, point. At the end of the day, in either case 
prices (per unit) are decreasing. Moreover, the main difference among 
the models arises only at very small lots where there is no data. In some 
ways, this only serves to underscore Hamilton’s message: when zoning 
prohibits the consumption of small lots (or small housing bundles), we 
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get something very much like an entry ticket to the community or, as 
discussed above, a two-part tariff. Whether we extrapolate over the 
range where there is no data using a straight line or a steep curve is 
really academic. 
Conclusion 
Zoning poses a property rights dilemma. On the one hand, it is a 
restriction on the rights of individual landowners. On the other hand, 
it empowers local communities to close the commons against excessive 
entry and so-called jurisdictional choice externalities. For example, 
minimum lots sizes or height restrictions effectively place a cap on the 
number of dwelling units that can be built in a community. When local 
public goods are congested, or rivalrous, such restrictions are essential 
to prevent overcrowding.  
In equilibrium, zoning has the effect of pricing access to a 
community with a two-part tariff. First, there is an entry ticket, a lump 
sum payment regardless of the lot size purchased. Second, there is a 
price per unit of land. The first price is essential for pricing the scarcity 
of the congested public good. The second price is essential for pricing 
the scarcity of land itself, a price that may vary depending on 
uncongested public goods as well as land quality. In this paper, I 
provide empirical evidence that land is priced in just this way. This 
evidence suggests that a market in local public goods is alive and well, 
along with the efficiency benefits markets can provide. If so, it provides 
a powerful argument for why public goods should be provided at a local 
level whenever possible. For in that case, the allocative efficiency of 
markets as well as the market incentives for efficient “production”  
of public goods overcomes the standard problems in the provision of  
public goods. 
 
 
 
 
 
